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Not All Funds are Born Equal: Why Value Works

Historically, equities constitute the top performing global asset class. However, the available evidence shows that most active investors are unable to achieve similar returns. To the contrary, a wide body of evidence shows that the market beats about three-quarters of professional fund managers over reasonable investment periods. This is an unfortunate and expensive result for investors and an indictment of active portfolio management.

Despite this result, in our last note we made a case for active management by recognising that not all managers are beaten by the market. Instead, the set of managers that succeed in producing superior investment results exhibit common characteristics in their investment processes (see *In Search of Success: A Contrarian Case*), which means that investment performance has little to do with luck. But, this argument demands a key qualification: those managers that have been most successful in producing long runs of “abnormal” returns share a further common factor, namely their subscription to the value philosophy.

This outcome rests on the simple, but powerful result that markets are not efficient: investors pushing prices down too far and up too high. This behavioral pattern of overreaction is not unique to capital markets. If you want evidence of this, talk to supporters of winning or losing sports teams as the result of the game is delivered.¹ One group is swept away in a wave of euphoria whilst the other wallows in morbid gloom – until the next game, of course. In any event, it is this human act of emotional overreaction that causes assets to be habitually mispriced. Moreover, because investors “herd”, it follows that many investors make the wrong decisions together. Conversely, and as argued in our previous note, by standing apart from the crowd and stripping emotional influences out of the investment decision, an active investor is afforded the opportunity to beat the market.

Returning to the argument, one of the best documented sources of consistent outperformance caused by investor overreaction and herding is found in the pricing anomalies of value shares. Value shares commonly are identified by characteristics such as low price-earnings ratios, high dividend yields, high cash flow-earnings ratios, low price-net asset value ratios and high rates of return on equity and return on assets relative to market valuations. Significantly, equities that carry such distorted valuations often do so because they are out of favour, neglected or sometimes just misunderstood. Yet, active managers who diligently pursue value strategies demonstrate some of the best investment results.


The investment literature is rich with cases of the success of value strategies. By far the most well known study undertaken on the value effect is Eugene Fama and Kenneth French’s (1998) examination of equities listed on 12 exchanges over the 20-year period 1975-1995. Their findings show that value shares outperformed growth shares in all but one of the countries examined (Italy) with value shares delivering an average return that outpaced growth shares by more than five percentage points per annum. More recently, in *The Little Book That Beats the Market*, Joel Greenblatt (2006) showed that a portfolio of 30 shares that traded at below-market price-earnings ratios but with above-average returns on assets would have earned the investor 30.8 percent per annum over the period 1988-2004 as opposed to the market average of 12.4 percent per annum. This annual difference would mean that the investor in Greenblatt’s value portfolio would have had a terminal portfolio value 13 times greater than an index portfolio.

¹ A recent example of crowd euphoria and hysteria is provided by comparing the general reaction of South African supporters during the recent Twenty 20 World Cup which saw South Africa blast 208 runs to beat the West Indies by 8 wickets with 14 balls to spare. A little over a week later South Africa were knocked out of the competition as they struggled to achieve 126 runs to progress to the semi-final stage of the competition, let alone the 153 runs that India scored to win the contest. The result is that optimism and euphoria are rapidly displaced by pessimism and gloom. This type of emotionally charged reaction is commonplace, and generally eclipses sensible, long-term analysis.

Based on the wider evidence, it is difficult to avoid the conclusion that the value phenomenon is “global” and “deep”: it is universal and it persists over time. Over reasonable investment periods, value shares beat growth shares and value shares beat the market. This finding begs the question: “Does the value phenomenon exist in the South African setting and, if so, does it persist?”

To this end, Cannon Asset Managers’ investment team has constructed a “deep value” portfolio that has run for the past 11 years. The stock selection rule is straightforward: the value portfolio consists of the three counters with the lowest price-earnings ratios in each of the large financial and industrial sectors, that is, the most shunned companies.² The portfolio’s performance is measured against returns generated by a suitable market index (the passive argument) and a portfolio made up of the companies that are most highly rated by the market (the growth argument).

The results of this exercise are astounding: on a compound basis our value portfolio has consistently beaten the market and the portfolio of growth shares by a wide margin. Over the period 1996 to end 2006, a passive investor who owned the market index would have earned an average annual return of 14.7 percent (including dividends). An active investor who had held the high price-earnings ratio portfolio would have earned a lower rate of return of 11.7 percent per annum over the same period. In sharp contrast, the value portfolio returned an average 25.8 percent per annum. On a cumulative basis, an investment in the index delivered a compound return of 270.5 percent, whilst the cumulative return on the growth portfolio was 192.9 percent. An investor in the value portfolio would have experienced a cumulative return of 871.4 percent. The figure below summarises the result.



In addition to the substantial outperformance delivered by the value portfolio, an analysis of risk metrics shows that this performance has been generated in a favourable fashion. For example, downside analysis reveals that the average return during the market’s three down years was a negative 12.6 percent. Over those periods the value portfolio outperformed the market by 25.2 percent per annum. Furthermore, 60.1 percent of the counters held in the value portfolio over the 11 years delivered positive year-on-year returns. The figure for the growth portfolio is 61.3 percent. Of course, given that the value portfolio is constructed out of neglected companies, one would imagine that the failure rate amongst this grouping is higher than the growth counters. Although this proves to be the case — the failure rates are statistically insignificant. Moreover, corporate action suggests that true opportunity lies hidden in the value portfolio where almost one in ten of the companies were the subject of a take-out or change in control versus one in twenty in the case of growth companies.

In short, the case of the South African market confirms the global experience: value holds as a successful investment philosophy. Of course, there is nothing to suggest that this strategy will not “hiccup”. Unlike Douglas Adams who told us that the answer to everything is exactly determined – by the number 42 – there is no way of knowing just how irrationally the market is behaving at any moment or whether it will become more irrational before it recaptures sanity. What we can argue however, is that the market is irrational most of the time. This provides active managers, who are

² The method and results are detailed more fully in the research report *Super Dogs: The Value of Active Value* which is available at www.cannonassets.co.za.

willing to stand away from the crowd, with the platform needed to “beat the market”. The point was made eloquently by Friedrich Nietzsche:

Most individuals are sane whilst most crowds are not. Crowds regularly behave in a way that the constituents, as individuals, would never countenance. Crowd behaviour is both magnificent and complex, and it is astounding that anyone believes that this type of behaviour should not affect a market (which is another collective).

Putting the point differently, if we have the ability to step away from the crowd and strip emotion out of the investment decision, we have the potential to put together a sustainable, market beating investment approach. Ultimately, the ability to adopt value investing as an active management style hinges on discipline, patience and the ability to withstand the sense of isolation brought about by being apart from the herd.

Glacier Research would like to thank Adrian Saville for his contribution to this week's Funds on Friday.

Addendum : Capping of Allan Gray Fusion Funds


From 8 October 2007, no Allan Gray collective investment schemes will be available for new business through the Glacier Fusion offering. Fusion allows investors the flexibility to combine both Fusion and non-Fusion funds. The Allan Gray options will, therefore, continue to remain available on Glacier's open platform.

This decision has been made as a result of Allan Gray Management Company embarking on a course of action that has the effect of increasing their fee at the expense of Glacier and the intermediary or the client. We have negotiated with them on this issue, but have been unsuccessful in securing an outcome which is in the best interests of both you and your clients.

The Fusion offering is a hand-picked range of funds which not only meets clients' investment needs, but also boasts representation by some of the most well-respected asset management houses and portfolio managers available. As a result of thoughtful selection, there are alternatives to the Fusion Allan Gray funds which you may want to consider.

Prudential Medium Equity

Funds in this category diversify across equities, bonds, money market and property investments. These portfolios tend to display less volatility than a general equity fund, aim for medium to long term capital growth and will have equity exposure between 40% and 65%. Some of these funds are Reg28 compliant.



	6 months	1 Year	2 Years*	3 Years*
Allan Gray Balanced	4.46%	23.37%	25.30%	29.90%
Coronation Balanced Plus	5.36%	27.77%	26.19%	31.24%
Investec Managed	8.60%	22.07%	24.18%	29.11%
Nedgroup Investments Managed	1.84%	18.87%	19.85%	24.20%
Sanlam Balanced	5.78%	26.09%	26.33%	30.19%
Prudential Med Equity Sector Ave	4.87%	22.96%	22.65%	27.58%

*annualized

Sanlam Balanced

Steve Mills & Lindley Jeffrey

Total annual Fusion fee: 2.10%

Fusion saving: 0.65%

The fund is a top quartile performer over all long-term measurement periods, and is a true reflection of the SIM's pragmatic value house-view. Asset allocation is very active and during the past three quarters the fund has had no bond exposure. Recently, the managers have taken advantage of bond market weakness gaining long-dated bond exposure. The fund is a top quartile performer over all long-term measurement periods.

Investec Managed

Gail Daniels

Total annual Fusion fee: 1.80 - 4.00%

Fusion saving: 0.40-0.50%

Gail Daniels is an aggressive stockpicker with a formidable reputation. The fund has fared well through most markets and currently is exposed to the maximum allowable equities as per the category. Gail also manages the Investec's flagship equity fund.

Coronation Balanced Plus

Karl Leinberger & Louis Stassen

Total annual Fusion fee: 2.35%

Fusion saving: 0.40%

The dual management approach of this fund combines both youth (in Karl Leinberger) and experience (in Louis Stassen). The fund has been managed on this basis since January 2005 and over the last two years has delivered performance in the top two quartiles. The stock selection is driven by Coronation's bottom-up research. The fund continues to be fully invested in offshore assets (mostly foreign equities).


Nedgroup Managed

Piet Viljoen

Total annual Fusion fee: 2.35%

Fusion saving: 0.40%

This is a conservative offering in the Medium Equity space and relative to the peer group the fund has consistently had a lower equity exposure. During 2006 the mandate of the fund was broadened to allow offshore exposure which at the moment is maximized. This is the only way that retail balanced fund investors can access the management skills of Piet Viljoen, as his Re:Cm Core Managed fund is closed to new investments.

General Equity

	6 months	1 Year	2 Years*	3 Years*
Allan Gray Equity	2.86%	32.63%	34.18%	39.71%
Investec Equity	7.76%	33.25%	31.22%	38.24%
Nedgroup Investments Rainmaker	6.77%	32.04%	31.99%	39.58%
PSG Alphen Growth	3.24%	28.08%	30.32%	38.71%
Sanlam General Equity	7.15%	40.64%	35.26%	39.18%
SIM Top Choice Equity	7.87%	48.58%	Not Started	Not Started
General Equity Sector Ave	7.49%	35.15%	31.76%	37.29%

*annualized

Sanlam General Equity

Claude van Cuyck

Total annual Fusion fee: 2.10%
Fusion saving: 0.40%

Van Cuyck and his team have succeeded in turning this fund around to become one of the best performers in the category. Van Cuyck is a passionate manager, and has built up a convincing track record with Sanlam's Industrial fund prior to taking over this fund.

PSG Alphen Growth

Shaun le Roux

Total annual Fusion fee: 2.35%
Fusion saving: 0.65%

The fund manager displays a very active approach to investing and although on average the fund is style neutral, at times it has had more of a growth bias. Although volatile, performance has been satisfactory.

SIM Top Choice Equity

Patrice Rassou

Total annual Fusion fee: 2.25 - 3.35%
Fusion saving: 0.15%

The fund is an actively managed, high-conviction portfolio which reflects the best ideas and most active positions held throughout SIM's equity unit trust range. It holds a maximum of 20 stocks in the portfolio.

Investec Equity

Gail Daniel

Total annual Fusion fee: 1.70 - 4.00%
Fusion saving: 0.40 - 0.50%

This fund has a very convincing track record, and is the top performing General Equity fund over a ten-year period. The fund has a rotational management style and from time to time will switch between value and growth philosophies, depending on where the manager finds most opportunities.

Nedgroup Rainmaker


Tim Allsop

Total annual Fusion fee: 2.10 – 3.00%
Fusion saving: 0.00 -0.90%

Allsop is a true stock-picker and aims to achieve superior medium- to long-term capital growth through careful stock selection and exposure to selected equity themes, both locally and abroad. The fund has a solid track record and has performed well throughout all market conditions.

Prudential Low Equity

Funds in this category invest across equities, bonds, money market and property markets. These portfolios tend to display reduced short term volatility, aim for long term capital growth and have a maximum equity exposure of 40%.



	6 months	1 Year	2 Years*	3 Years*
Allan Gray Stable	2.82%	13.03%	15.56%	16.80%
Investec Cautious Managed	3.73%	11.96%	Not Started	Not Started
RMB Conservative	4.76%	15.50%	16.63%	Not Started
Prudential Low Equity Sector Ave	3.54%	14.96%	13.60%	15.79%

*annualized

Investec Cautious Managed

Sam Houlie

Total annual Fusion fee: 2.35%

Fusion saving: 0.40%

This fund makes use of a value-based, contrarian approach to stock selection which reduces the equity downside risk. Active asset-allocation and good stock selection continue to add alpha.

RMB Conservative

Vlad Anuchin

Total annual Fusion fee: 2.35%

Fusion saving: 0.40%

It seeks to provide a degree of income and growth with a lower level of risk and volatility. The portfolio will aim to achieve a minimum of 15% and a maximum of 35% effective equity exposure to achieve the given objective, with a lower level of risk.

Glacier Financial Solutions Cautious Fund of Funds

Ursula Maritz

Total annual Fusion fee: 2.30%

Fusion saving: 0.25%

A fund of funds that mainly invests into underlying institutional unit trusts, which makes the fund more cost-effective than other fund of funds. Diversification benefits are achieved on both an asset allocation and manager selection level.